Challenges with 5G Networks a Base for Critical Infrastucture


Mobil Agenda; fagseminar: "**5G sikkerhet**" 2019-06-13


Bjarne E. Helvik

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
























Trigger activities

- Co-op with various partners in SDN, VNF an 5G
- CleanSky
 - Robust cloud service provisioning and management



- Resilient Communication Services Protecting End-user Applications from Disaster-based Failures
 - Large-scale natural disasters





- Technology-related disasters
- Malicious human activities
- **–** ...
- Centre for Intelligent Electricity Distribution







- **–** ...
- Norwegian Center for Critical Infrastructures Cyber Security (NORCICS); SFI application



Vision for the "2020 network"





Figure 1. NEC's vision for the "2020 network"



ICT infrastructure also encompasses information and services






Providing Wireless access

Providing the ICT infrastructure support


Significantly improved performance in the radio access network


- heterogenous cell structure,
- new radio interfaces
- mmWave, MIMO, ...

- Virtualizing of network internal and external functions (SDN, VNF)
- Use of «clouds»
- Verticals slices; adapted to customer and service
- Multi-tenant and multi-domain == tighter integration between heterogenous actors
- Orchestration and management











A. de la Oliva & al., 5G-Transformer: Slicing and orchestrating transport networks for industry verticals. IEEE Communications Magazine, 56(8):78–84, August 2018.

Change in service delivery paradigm




a) To-days relation




 b) 5G integrates the application into the communication infrastucture

5G becomes the carrier of "all" critical infrastructures




There are tough requirements






S.M. Rinaldi, J.P. Peerenboom, and T.K. Kelly. *Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies*. Control Systems, IEEE, 21(6):11–25, 2001.






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







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Common ICT platform








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Tight interconnectedness (Intelligent) Water & transport Power vaste supply Emergency Electronic services payments 5G

Common ICT platform





S.M. Rinaldi, J.P. Peerenboom, and T.K. Kelly. *Identifying, understanding, and analyzing critical infrastructure interdependencies*. Control Systems, IEEE, 21(6):11–25, 2001.

• Tight interconnectedness
• Short/no lead times

Power supply


(Intelligent) transport waste

Emergency services

Electronic payments


5G

Common ICT platform




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- Common ICT platform
- Tight interconnectedness
- Short/no lead times
 - Less transparency









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- Common ICT platform
- Tight interconnectedness
- Short/no lead times
- Less transparency
 - Increased complexity







Shift in risk








5G a disaster accelerator?





























A unpretentious indicative Google scholar search

5G "critical infrastructures"

- Empirical comparison of virtualized and bare-metal switching for SDN-based 5G communication in critical infrastructures
- Preventive maintenance of critical infrastructures using 5G networks & drones
- Network slicing for critical communications in shared 5G infrastructures-an empirical evaluation

5G disaster

- Towards efficient disaster management: 5G and Device to Device communication
- On the disaster resiliency within the context of 5G networks: The RECODIS experience
- Challenges of 5G Usability in Disaster Management
- On the disaster resiliency within the context of 5G networks
- Robust Device-to-Device 5G Cellular Communication in the Post-Disaster Scenario
- FINDER: A D2D based critical communications framework for disaster management in 5G
- Post-disaster 4G/5G Network Rehabilitation using Drones: Solving Battery and Backhaul Issues
- Green Base Station Using Robust Solar System and High Performance Lithium ion battery for Next Generation Wireless Network (5G) and against Mega Disaster





The conception that 5G may be

- a vehicle for infrastructure outage propagation
- the cause of infrastructure outages



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is not paid significant attention.



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The conception that 5G may be

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- the cause of infrastructure outages
 is not paid significant attention.

The risk scenario will be significantly changed.



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The risk scenario will be significantly changed.

The challenge should be addressed in design, regulations and operation

